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Scholarly Conversations, Intellectual Virtues, and Virtue Information Literacy
Wayne Bivens-Tatum
Abstract
This article develops a concept of Virtue Information Literacy (VIL) modeled on the
philosophical subfields of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. VIL is an ethical, characterbased approach analyzing information literacy through intellectual virtues and vices in order to
cultivate such virtues with the goal of living a more flourishing life. The article explains the
foundation of VIL in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology; analyzes recent work making similar
connections between information literacy, virtue epistemology, and intellectual virtues and vices;
and finally with the aid of Richard Rorty’s pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics analyzes some intellectual virtues especially useful for “Scholarship
as Conversation,” including open-mindedness, intellectual humility, intellectual courtesy, and
intellectual thoroughness.
Introduction
Is it better to be an information literate person than not? If so, then one of the many
things librarians try to do is educate themselves and their students to be better people in this
particular way. And what might it even mean to be an information literate person? Partly, or so I
argue below, being an information literate person involves having certain intellectual virtues that
make it more likely than not that you will be successful in library research, scholarly inquiry,
information evaluation, and any of the other tasks that we might classify as part of information
literacy, because information literacy involves exercising practical wisdom in informationseeking situations and contributes to human flourishing and a well-lived life. I pay special
attention to the intellectual virtues requisite for successful “scholarly conversations,” and
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consider such virtues to be information virtues as well as intellectual virtues, and I shall call the
ethical, character-based approach to information literacy highlighting these virtues Virtue
Information Literacy (VIL).
Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology
My concept of Virtue Information Literacy (VIL) is modeled on virtue ethics and
especially virtue epistemology. Before examining the Weak Autonomous Virtue Epistemology
that has most influence my approach, I shall briefly explain the significance of the “virtue”
modifier in relation to ethics and epistemology and now information literacy. “Virtue” in these
cases is often a translation of the ancient Greek word aretē (ἀρετή), which can also be translated
as “excellence.” A virtue is thus an excellence of some kind rooted in a person’s character, a
moral excellence in the case of virtue ethics and an intellectual excellence in the case of virtue
epistemology. In the case of VIL, I will also speak of information virtues or excellences. Thus,
information virtues are those character traits that will help people be more information literate
than they otherwise would be.
Virtue ethics contrasts with the two dominant ways of thinking about ethics in modern
philosophy: consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialist ethical approaches such as
utilitarianism argue that we should evaluate actions based on their consequences. Utilitarianism,
for example, usually posits some variation of “the greatest good for the greatest number” as a
standard for evaluation. Deontological ethics evaluates actions based on whether they adhere to
some standard of duty or the right thing to do. Familiar examples might include the Ten
Commandments, the Buddhist precepts, and Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act only according
to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law”
(Kant 1993, 30). For both approaches, the locus of evaluation is the actions of persons rather
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than the character of persons. We are ethical if we “use our resources to help others the most” as
the recent “effective altruism” movement requires, or if we fulfill our duty according to some
rule for appropriate action, whether based in religion, philosophy, or politics.
Instead of consequences or duties, virtue ethics approaches ethical actions by asking what
sort of person we should be, and answers that question by developing a list of character virtues
that humans should acquire through education and training. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—a
core text for virtue ethics—examines the traditional list of classical virtues such as courage,
moderation, prudence or practical wisdom, and justice. (Aristotle 2014, Bks 3-5). Christians add
what are sometimes called the “theological virtues” of faith, hope, and charity. While it may be
useful to analyze ethical actions based on their consequences or their adherence to an appropriate
code of ethics, virtue ethicists think about what sort of character traits we should have in order to
act ethically in the world, and furthermore why and how we should develop such character traits.
The goal of classical virtue ethics is eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness” but with a
broader meaning of a well-lived, flourishing life. Virtue ethicists argue, for example, that being
the sort of person who is courageous or just and who especially has cultivated the practical
wisdom to act courageously or justly in particular circumstances will help us live such a
eudaimonic life.
Where virtue ethics focuses on moral virtues and their relationship to living a eudaimonic
life, virtue epistemology extends that focus to epistemology (the theory of knowledge). Virtue
epistemologists ask what intellectual virtues would make it more likely for us to attain
knowledge, which will in turn make us more likely to live well. In Book 6 of the Nicomachean
Ethics, for example, Aristotle examines the virtues of good deliberation or comprehension as
components of the practically wise person. Other intellectual virtues analyzed in the literature
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include love of knowledge, curiosity, intellectual humility, intellectual autonomy, openmindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual perseverance. Virtue epistemology subdivides
into reliabilist and responsibilist versions. Reliabilist virtue epistemology focuses on intellectual
virtues that make it more likely the knowledge we attain is reliable and includes virtues largely
out of our control such as perception, memory, or sheer cognitive ability. People with naturally
excellent memories or cognitive processing skills are more likely to attain reliable knowledge
than people with poor skills, but while some such skills can be cultivated, these are possibly
more reliant upon nature than nurture. Responsibilist virtue epistemology focuses on intellectual
virtues that might not guarantee our knowledge is reliable, but do make it more likely that, if
practiced, our inquiry will lead to knowledge more successfully than otherwise, and that
furthermore these virtues can be developed through education, training, and self-cultivation. We
might not be able to do much about whether we are naturally intellectually brilliant, but we can
cultivate open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and perseverance once we know what they are
and understand their value for inquiry and knowledge acquisition.
Along these lines, virtue information literacy focuses on intellectual or information
virtues that we can cultivate in ourselves and our students and that make it more likely, if
practiced, for us to attain greater information literacy, with the assumption that information
literacy in relevant contexts makes it more likely that our inquiries—particularly our scholarly
inquiries—will more likely lead to knowledge than otherwise, and that the ability to act in
information literate ways will help us lead more flourishing lives. That is a lot to ask of a typical
one-shot library instruction class, but information literacy concerns the entire educational
endeavor, not just the typical scope and actions of librarians. Hopefully, VIL can also help us
understand some common scholarly and IL behaviors and problems in new and useful ways.
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As an aside, although I use the word knowledge, I should note that librarians are in the
information business, not the knowledge or truth business, and we need not have theories of
knowledge or truth to consider my version of VIL. Debates within epistemology about whether
knowledge is justified true belief (the traditional philosophical definition) have little relevance to
whether someone is more likely to attain knowledge through appropriate information behaviors
than otherwise. For my purposes, I have in mind a minimal pragmatist conception of knowledge
as justified belief acquired through inquiry, with the modes of inquiry and standards of
justification relative to the epistemic communities we inhabit and the types of claims we want to
make. This view of knowledge is rooted in scholarly conversations. Typically, for scholarly
epistemic communities justification will consist of some combination of evidence, analysis, and
argument, with what counts as evidence determined by more specific epistemic subcommunities,
from the quantitative empirical research employed by the sciences to the textual analysis and
interpretation employed by the humanities generally to “the development and explication of
fundamental concepts” through “conceptual analysis, historical critique, and creative
redescription” often employed by philosophical approaches (and which I engage in here)
(Gutting 1999, 193).
As with my own rejection of any need to define knowledge for VIL, virtue
epistemologists do not necessarily need “to formulate a deﬁnition of knowledge or an account of
justiﬁcation” to consider “the character of the intellectual life in a way that can actually help
people live that life” (Roberts and Wood 2007, 28). In Intellectual Virtues: an Essay in
Regulative Epistemology, Robert Roberts and Jay Wood specifically argue against the necessity
of such an account of knowledge or justification in order to bring “legitimate epistemic
desiderata…together in one conception—that of the excellent epistemic agent, the person of
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intellectual virtues.” They “propose that in general a human virtue is an acquired base of
excellent functioning in some generically human sphere of activity that is challenging and
important” and that “intellectual virtues… are simply acquired bases of excellent intellectual
functioning,” “dispositions to use our epistemic faculties well—in the excellent pursuit of the
goods internal to cognitive practices” (Roberts and Wood 2007, 42). They analyze in detail the
intellectual virtues of love of knowledge, firmness, courage and caution, humility, autonomy,
generosity, and practical wisdom in order to provide guidance (or regulation) for those who
desire to cultivate intellectual virtues and a flourishing intellectual life, and include analyses of
such intellectual practices as reading, public debate, and teaching that benefit from the
cultivation of intellectual virtues. Librarians could add common library research-related practices
including searching for and engaging in scholarly conversations, which I treat in more depth
below.
In The Inquiring Mind, Jason Baehr also bypasses a definition or theory of knowledge to
focus on the actions of inquiry—which involve “observing, imagining, reading, interpreting,
reﬂecting, analyzing, assessing, formulating, and articulating” and the success of which “requires
an exercise of certain intellectual character traits” such as “attentive observation, thoughtful or
open-minded imagination, patient reﬂection, careful and thorough analysis, or fair-minded
interpretation and assessment” (Baehr 2011, 1). Along with Roberts and Wood, Baehr develops
an “autonomous” approach to virtue epistemology “largely independent of traditional
[epistemological] questions” rather than trying to answer those questions. This autonomous
“approach is ‘weak’ because it regards an autonomous concern with intellectual virtue as merely
complementing—not replacing—traditional epistemology” (199). Similarly, my view of virtue
information literacy could be construed as a Weak Autonomous VIL, in that I am not attempting
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to replace the traditional concerns or answer the traditional questions of information literacy, but
instead to provide a complementary character-based, ethical way of viewing information literacy.
To a great extent VIL is an extension of Baehr’s project in the domain he labels “applied
virtue epistemology,” an application I have found particularly fruitful for analyzing information
literacy. His analysis suggests “that there are ﬁxed and generic domains of human activity (e.g.
journalism, law, science, and education) success in which makes substantial and reasonably
systematic demands on a person’s intellectual character,” and that “these demands would appear
to be traceable and worth exploring and understanding from a philosophical standpoint.”
Questions we might ask of them include:
What exactly is the (intellectual character-relevant) structure of this domain? What sorts
of demands does success in this domain make on a person’s intellectual character? Which
intellectual virtues are relevant to meeting these demands? And how exactly are they
relevant? Are there potential conﬂicts between the requirements of intellectual virtue and
the requirements for success in this domain? If so, how should they be understood and
adjudicated? (201)
This essay attempts to answer some of these questions regarding information literacy and library
research, particularly within higher education. Baehr goes farther and argues that “an intellectual
virtue is a character trait that contributes to its possessor’s personal intellectual worth on
account of its involving a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods” (102).
While I might believe that possessing information virtues and being information literate in
relevant contexts do increase one’s intellectual worth, my conception of VIL does not require
such a belief. It could be that being information literate in relevant contexts makes us better
people than we might otherwise be, but my argument here does not depend on that claim.
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Information Literacy and Intellectual Vices
Other researchers have linked virtue epistemology with information literacy. One way to
highlight the importance of intellectual virtues for information literacy is through analysis of the
relationship between information literacy and intellectual vices. In their introduction to a recent
special issue of Postdigital Science and Education on “Lies, Bullshit and Fake News,” Alison
MacKenzie and Ibrar Bhatt hint at the connection (MacKenzie and Bhatt 2020). They refer to a
short analysis by Quassim Cassam on the usefulness of “vice epistemology” when trying to
explain the rise of fake news, including such vices as “closed-mindedness, arrogance, prejudice,
dogmatism, overconfidence, and wishful thinking”(Cassam n.d.). (In a longer treatment, Cassam
adds vices such as carelessness and gullibility (Cassam 2016, 159)). They pay particular
attention to the vice of epistemic arrogance, which I address below.
An article in that special issue by Jennifer Rose addresses epistemic issues related to
“fake news.” Without specifically mentioning virtue epistemology or information literacy, Rose
shows VIL in practice and provides a succinct analysis of the epistemic concerns around “fake
news” and how educators might “help knowers understand the limits of their epistemological
stances in relation to fake news in online environments through enhancing critical thinking
pedagogical strategies that seek to combat fake news” (Rose 2020, 215). After detailing specific
problems of knowledge related to online news, she notes that “even a diligent online news
consumer who diligently extends one’s epistemic and factchecking capabilities to seek the truth
may not be able to overcome the inherent deceit of fake news” (207). Regardless of how much
fact-checking we might be able to do, online news—fake or otherwise—often exceeds our ability
to verify it. She concludes that education can “help online news consumers understand what they
can and cannot know when they encounter an online news story” because “understanding the
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requirements of knowing and realizing what one cannot know because of limited access to
evidence is…a first step towards reducing one’s acceptance of fake news.” In addition, education
can “help online news consumers understand the limits to the knowledge that they already
possess and understand its limits of applicability,” because “even if one possesses knowledge
and truth, these true justified beliefs may be inadequate for assessing the truth of fake news.”
(213) She argues persuasively that evaluating online news requires more than fact-checking, that
such evaluation benefits from considering intellectual virtues and vices, and that educators
should help “students understand their inherent contextual, epistemological constraints on
uncovering the truth of fake news” through the cultivation of intellectual humility by
“encouraging students to explicate all of their reasons for holding, accepting, or rejecting a
belief” (214).
Rose does a good job of explaining how our epistemic limitations complicate the
evaluation of online news, but “fake news” can also help explain what I believe to be the
intuitive appeal of virtue epistemology and virtue information literacy. She analyzes a fake news
article regarding fraudulent pre-marked ballots during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. A
more outlandish conspiracy theory (to my mind at least) might better highlight why information
literate people feel puzzled by people who believe some fake news stories, so I use Pizzagate
instead, a conspiracy theory that claimed leaked emails of Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager
“contained coded messages that connected several U.S. restaurants and high-ranking officials of
the Democratic Party with an alleged human trafficking and child sex ring.”(“Pizzagate
Conspiracy Theory” 2020) One young man sought to fact-check this story by driving from North
Carolina to Washington, D.C., entering a pizza restaurant allegedly used in this human
trafficking scheme, and firing a rifle on the premises (Kang and Goldman 2016). One might
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argue that at least he did not simply accept what he had read online as fact, but a question that
arises for me regarding Pizzagate or other highly improbable stories is, why would anyone
believe this in the first place?
The fact that anyone could believe some of the more outlandish fake news stories and
conspiracy theories puzzles a lot of people, perhaps especially librarians and other educators who
are professionally involved in the evaluation of information. This puzzlement can be partly
explained through consideration of intellectual virtues and vices, because chalking up such
beliefs to human stupidity does not explain much. Indeed, if Michael Shermer is correct, being
smart or stupid has nothing to do with it. He argues that “smart people believe weird things
because they are skilled at defending beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons” (Shermer
2002, 283). Information literate people, people trained to evaluate information, might be puzzled
by the gullibility of others not because they are so much smarter than gullible people, but
because they possess character traits that the gullible do not. They possess intellectual and
information virtues cultivated over long practice in evaluating information, in this case
particularly a healthy skepticism towards information that emerges in online echo chambers and
has not been verified in any concrete way. If they do not outright dismiss such claims, they
suspend judgment until sufficient evidence is forthcoming, which in practice is much the same
thing. Even someone hostile to Hillary Clinton might reasonably conclude that were she actually
involved in a human trafficking ring, nobody would make much of a fuss over her email
controversy (“Hillary Clinton Email Controversy” 2020). Information literate people tend to
have intellectually internalized the “Sagan standard” that “extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence” (“Sagan Standard” 2020). That Clinton played fast and loose with email
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servers seems plausible, that she is a human trafficker not so much, that she is a member of the
reptilian elite (Time n.d.) beyond the pale, at least for the information literate.
It is difficult, I maintain, for information literate people to understand why some
conspiracy theorists can hold such implausible beliefs because the information literate have
cultivated intellectual virtues that the conspiracy theorists have not. Information literate people,
for example, do not believe an improbable proposition is true because it has not been
conclusively disproven, but such belief structures are typical for conspiracy theorists, and indeed
for many people engaged in motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoners can be motivated by, for
example, “directional outcomes” that involve “reaching specific desired conclusions, such as
impressions of themselves as intelligent, caring, and worthy people, or positive beliefs about
others whom they find likeable or to whom they are especially close” or nondirectional outcomes
such as “such as reaching the most accurate conclusion possible or making a clear and concise
decision, whatever this conclusion or decision may be” (Daniel C. Molden and Higgins 2005,
296–97). Our desired outcome affects our ability to search for and evaluate information.
Psychological research has shown some evidence, for example, that “people engage in increased
evidence evaluations and prolonged information search when encountering evidence unfavorable
to their preferred self-views and reduced evidence evaluation and information search when
encountering evidence favorable to their preferred self-views ” (301–2). If we want to believe
that Clinton is a reptilian overlord or child trafficker, we are more likely to believe information
that supports that claim. However, if we are motived to be accurate, as information literacy
instruction suggests, we also might prolong our information search and evaluation.
Information literate people have trouble understanding why people uncritically believe in
Pizzagate and other fake news because our education and training encourage us to instinctually
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question its veracity. Information literacy has become a second nature, a part of our intellectual
character. We might wonder why people do not either dismiss such fake news or try to verify it
using information literacy techniques, but it could be that the information illiterate have neither
the training nor the disposition to do so. If I am right, it is not just that people lack the skills to
verify such information, and Jennifer Rose points out all the problems with trying to verify
online information. It is also that some people just do not want to approach information
critically, particularly information that confirms their biases or threatens their worldview. They
want to believe, so the belief comes before and resists any evidence. We might all be like this
some of the time about some topics, and many critically thoughtful and information literate
people might bracket questions of religion or politics, but information illiterate people are like
this much of the time, and this puzzles the information literate.
Fake news and conspiracy theories are always with us, but character-based information
virtues manifest themselves in more typical academic contexts as well. While school librarians
work with children’s information literacy and many librarians have recently paid attention to
fake news (Batchelor 2017, Rose-Wiles 2018, Barclay 2017)2/22/2021 4:34:00 PM academic
librarians perhaps more often work with college students on research assignments, and attending
to intellectual vices makes sense of some of these encounters as well. Here I shall describe a
recent encounter I had with a student and why I interpreted our interaction through a virtue
information literacy lens specifically focused on a significant intellectual vice.
The student met with me at her instructor’s request to help her find a “scholarly
conversation” for her writing class’s research essay. Often I help students navigate scholarly
resources to find just such conversations, but that requires them to have actual research
questions. Sometimes students believe they have research questions, but what they actually have
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are fully formulated thesis statements which they afterwards seek to support by finding scholarly
sources that agree with their thesis statement, the first-year-composition version of smart people
defending beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons. In my experience, this often happens
because students are using the five-paragraph essay format they successfully employed in high
school to write research essays in college, where the format fails. (For those unfamiliar with the
format, a five-paragraph essay includes an introductory paragraph with a tripartite thesis
statement, three body paragraphs each addressing one of the three parts of the thesis, and a
concluding paragraph summarizing the thesis statement and body paragraphs.) There are
numerous problems with the format from a college research and writing perspective, but one
specific problem for library research purposes is that the format encourages students to come up
with thesis statements before they have done any actual research or reading by simply “using
their brain,” as my student put it, instead of researching a topic with a question in mind and
letting their research guide the development of their thesis statement. The backwards
construction of proper research this approach encourages leads to what one could call the Fiveparagraph Reference Question, which can be broadened to include any library research query
that tries to find research to support claims that have been formulated based on nothing but
unsupported opinion. Reference librarians probably recall questions like, “can you help me find
five scholarly source that support X position?”
Her thesis statement involved, among other things, a claim that a television advertisement
sponsored by an insurance company (Durando, n.d.) was unethical because it could make parents
feel like it—the advertisement—threatened their children, which on the face of it should seem as
implausible as the claim that Hillary Clinton is a shape-shifting reptilian overlord. She had
searched in vain for psychology articles that might support this and related claims, and indeed
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had found numerous articles reporting empirical psychological studies about the emotional
effects of television advertising, so searching databases and finding sources was not a problem.
However, the only result of such a search was to question the usefulness of empirical psychology
studies. (Given the controversies around p-hacking and replication problems in psychology, one
might legitimately question the value of many such studies, but that is another issue.)
What became gradually clear in our long conversation was that the student was both 1)
supremely confident in the worthwhileness of her claims and the method she had used to acquire
them, and 2) completely unable to defend any of them with evidence or argument because they
were completely unrelated to any intellectual or scholarly conversation regarding the topic, or
indeed any evidence at all. The five-paragraph-essay mentality helps explain why she was
engaging research in a backwards manner, but something else is required to explain this
combination of ignorance and epistemic arrogance. Ignorance itself is not an intellectual vice; we
are all vastly ignorant and recognizing that is a sign of intellectual maturity. Epistemic
arrogance—the belief that you are absolutely correct in your knowledge, that you have a sure
grip on the truth and anyone who disagrees with you is simply wrong—is an intellectual vice,
and the one Jennifer Rose’s preferred virtue of intellectual humility seeks to undermine.
However, it is possible for us to be epistemically arrogant and in fact be absolutely correct. But
epistemic arrogance combined with ignorance about the relevant topic—which I shall call
ignarrogance (no relation to the 1998 album by German power noise band Noisex)—might just
be the supreme intellectual vice. When Socrates said that he was the wisest man in Greece
because he knew that he knew nothing, he exemplified (possibly ironic) intellectual humility,
and his frequent challenges to people who claimed knowledge of something (e.g., justice or
piety) but who under examination in fact did not know were attempts to identify and eliminate
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ignarrogance. Once I realized that the student suffered from ignarrogance, I understood the
research consultation better.
My goal then expanded beyond explaining why her research approach was backwards,
why she needed to first do the research and reading and then formulate a thesis statement in
response to the research. That process does involve intellectual virtues that I shall discuss below.
Before that, however, my goal became the Socratic one of identifying and eliminating the
intellectual vice of ignarrogance, to get her to change her entire attitude towards knowledge
acquisition and scholarship; thus, I reframed the research consultation as intellectual therapy.
Although I had not yet read Rose’s article, my approach was similar to hers. I pointed out the
limitations of our knowledge, that in many cases we do not really know what we think we know,
and that not to understand the limitations of our ability to know and not to show intellectual
humility before the vast amount of knowledge we do not have harm us as students and scholars.
It is not just that we are worse people in some way—although I think we are—it is that we fail to
flourish intellectually as well as we might without such virtues. Also, we make worse grades. We
in the academy inhabit some version of what philosopher Wilfrid Sellars called the “logical
space of reasons” (Sellars 1963, 169), and scholarly conversations are not monologues designed
to propagate our preconceived beliefs, but dialogues to which we must open ourselves and
respond with reasons and justification. In our space of reasons and justification, we fare better if
we have cultivated relevant intellectual virtues.
Virtue Epistemology and the Framework
Others have begun to apply Baehr’s version of virtue epistemology specifically to
information literacy. Although concerned with “developing intellectual character in children’s
online information behaviours” David McMenemy and Steven Buchanan examine the “ACRL
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Framework for Information Literacy,” typically associated with academic research at the college
level. They use “Baehr’s framework of nine core virtues: curiosity; intellectual autonomy;
intellectual humility; attentiveness; intellectual carefulness; intellectual thoroughness; openmindedness; intellectual courage; and intellectual tenacity” (McMenemy and Buchanan 2018,
74) from his book Cultivating Good Minds (Baehr 2015). Baehr’s work is applicable when
considering information literacy at any intellectual level, and indeed he “helped found the
Intellectual Virtues Academy of Long Beach, a charter middle school in Long Beach, CA”
(“About” 2017).
When looking at the Framework from a virtue epistemology perspective, the frequent
mention of “dispositions” stands out. The presence of dispositions is, as they note, a “potential
indication that the approach taken in the development of the Framework is cognisant of character
issues.” Although intellectual virtues are not “manifest within” the Framework, their “latent
analysis identified several relationships” (McMenemy and Buchanan 2018, 78). As a reminder,
the Framework’s threshold concepts are: Authority Is Constructed and Contextual, Information
Creation as a Process, Information Has Value, Research as Inquiry, Scholarship as Conversation,
and Searching as Strategic Exploration (Association of College & Research Libraries (ACRL)
2015). McMenemy and Buchanan find some of Baehr’s core intellectual virtues particularly
latent in “Authority Is Constructed and Contextual” (open-mindedness and intellectual
carefulness); “Research as Inquiry” (curiosity, intellectual humility, and open-mindedness); and
“Scholarship as Conversation” (open-mindedness, intellectual humility, intellectual carefulness,
and intellectual thoroughness); with some latent presence within “Searching as Strategic
Exploration” (intellectual humility) ( 78–79). Their analysis is brief and they leave any
development of virtue epistemology in relation to information literacy for further research on
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such topics as “refining IL education models to explicitly incorporate application of intellectual
character virtues,” undertaking “empirical studies with children to explore appropriate methods
of intellectual character development,” and analyzing “current IL education for practitioners to
consider how VE concepts can be introduced into the professional body of knowledge” (81).
Intellectual Virtues and Scholarly Conversations
Although I began this project before encountering their article, my work here is directly
related to that of McMenemy and Buchanan, and we are all clearly influenced by Jason Baehr’s
applied virtue epistemology. While McMenemy and Buchanan ranged quickly through the entire
ACRL Framework, I would like to explore more deeply some intellectual virtues appropriate to
library research with a focus on “scholarly conversations.” They find open-mindedness,
intellectual humility, intellectual carefulness, and intellectual thoroughness latent within the
Framework’s threshold concept of “Scholarship as Conversation,” but their analysis leaves
unanswered why such virtues are important and necessary and how the notion of having a
scholarly conversation inherently requires certain intellectual character traits, as I believe to be
the case. To attempt answering that question, I will relate the idea of a scholarly conversation to
the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. A scholarly conversation, or perhaps better a
dialogue (with Plato’s dialogues as examples), is a discussion among two or more people seeking
knowledge and understanding through inquiry.
Earlier, I explained that my concept of knowledge for the purposes of explicating virtue
information literacy is deliberately minimal. Jennifer Rose concerns herself with the standard
analytical epistemology definition of knowledge as justified true belief, but for information
literacy purposes we may simplify that by jettisoning the notion of truth and just looking at
justified beliefs. To whom are our beliefs justified? The relevant answer in the context of a
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scholarly conversation is: other scholars, those with the highest standards for evidence and
justification relevant to our context, and perhaps ultimately the group that Chaim Perlman in a
rhetorical context calls the “universal audience” (Perelman et al. 1969, 31–34). This way of
viewing knowledge is hardly unique to me. Consider a passage from pragmatist philosopher
Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature:
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by scientists or philosophers,
but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to
seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood.
Our focus shifts from the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry
to the relation between alternative standards of justification, and from there to the actual
changes in those standards which make up intellectual history (Rorty 1979, 389–90).
Elsewhere, he summarizes pragmatism as “the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry
save conversational ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of
the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow
inquirers” (Rorty 1982, 165).
In Rorty’s pragmatism, knowledge and truth emerge out of human communication, where
people try to justify themselves to each other based on human standards rather than according to
some allegedly more fundamental standard such as God or Objective Reality. The “gap between
truth and justification” is simply “the gap between the actual good and the possible better,” and
“what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is simply to say that somebody may
come up with a better idea” because “new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a whole new
vocabulary, may come along” (Rorty 1999a, 23). Like controlled vocabularies, what counts as
knowledge and truth even among the best relevant cognitive authorities adapts as we come to

19
understand the world in new ways, although like controlled vocabularies this adaptation may be
slow.
Instead of a final, metaphysically grounded knowledge immune to historical and cultural
evolution, pragmatists aim for “as much intersubjective agreement as possible.” Rorty argues
that the “distinction between knowledge and opinion…is simply the distinction between topics
on which such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is relatively
hard to get.” And since “there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from
descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society – ours – uses in one
or another area of inquiry,” “we should drop the traditional distinction between knowledge and
opinion, construed as the distinction between truth as correspondence to reality and truth as a
commendatory term for well-justified beliefs” (Rorty, 1999a). Even Rorty acknowledges that it
“may seem strange to say that there is no connection between justification and truth…because
we are inclined to say that truth is the aim of inquiry,” within a Darwinian worldview some
ultimate standard of truth such as “justification before God, or before the tribunal of reason, as
opposed to any merely finite human audience” is neither possible nor desirable. In this
worldview, “such a tribunal would have to envisage all the alternatives to a given belief, and
know everything that was relevant to criticism of every such alternative” (Rorty 1999b, 37). If
there is an aim of inquiry and research, it could be a better understanding of whatever it is we are
trying to understand, more justifiable beliefs than we hitherto had, but not some ultimate
foundation of metaphysical, ahistorical truth. Is this view of knowledge and truth really true?
Within the context of VIL, such arguments do not matter.
In teaching and learning how to find, evaluate, and use scholarly sources—typical
librarian tasks—librarians operate within a pragmatic understanding of knowledge. We ask, what

20
is an authoritative source, for example, with the understanding that authority is “contextual and
constructed.” As Amy Hofer, Silvia Lin Hanick, and Lori Townsend nicely expand the concept
in their book Transforming Information Literacy Instruction, “authority is a form of intellectual
trust granted by an individual or community to an information source. It is both constructed, built
through expertise and persistent reliability, and contextual, limited to certain knowledge domains
or situations and shaped by community norms” (Hofer, Lin Hanick, and Townsend 2019, 58).
Thus, “peer-reviewed” does not mean “absolutely correct” but something more like, “meets the
intellectual standards of a relevant epistemic community.” Because librarians work at the level of
scholarly conversations, they do not have to have a theory of knowledge as “grounded” in some
allegedly objective reality. And when it comes to teaching students to evaluate information, we
do not ultimately decide whether information is true or constitutes knowledge, but more often
teach “markers that act as heuristics (rules of thumb)”, including “qualifications like degrees,
years of experience, reputation, and indications of quality control processes such as editorial and
peer review” (59). Librarians don’t typically read and evaluate scholarly publications and tell
students that “not only is this article published in a high-impact journal by a researcher
associated with a top university, but it’s also true. I’m a librarian; I should know!”
Olaf Sundin and Jenny Johannisson also apply Rorty’s pragmatist view of knowledge to
LIS, although for different purposes than mine. (Their article provides a useful succinct
discussion of Rorty versus his critics, as does Malachowski 2014, ch.6). They analyze the
“concept of communicative participation as an alternative, or complement, to the concept of
information seeking” and note that Rorty “argues for intersubjectivity, community and
solidarity—concepts which focus on communication and on the importance of justification”
(Sundin and Johannisson 2005, 24). This communicative view of knowledge implies that
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“justification…can never find ultimate validation or falsification by referent to an independent
reality, but is created in interaction between humans…within a specific community of
justification” where the “only criteria by which to judge a method is that of judging its usefulness
in relation to a particular purpose” (30, 31). Sundin and Johannisson apply this perspective to
information-seeking research within LIS, while I borrow this minimal pragmatist conception of
knowledge because it helps illuminate the importance of intellectual virtues such as openmindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual thoroughness for the commonly used
Framework threshold concept of “Scholarship as Conversation.” Scholarly conversation as a
metaphor naturally suggests a view of the world where we seek knowledge and understanding
within communities of justification, and operating within these communities most successfully
requires some intellectual virtues.
To further examine the relationship between conversations, knowledge, and intellectual
virtues, I turn to the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose influence Rorty
acknowledges. (For a very different but interesting use of Gadamer within LIS thought, see
Burgess 2016.) Traditionally, hermeneutics is the science of interpreting texts, initially Biblical
texts, but Gadamer extends hermeneutics to all questions of human understanding involving
language, and for Gadamer “all human knowledge of the world is linguistically mediated” and
“all experience takes place in our constant communicative cultural education into our knowledge
of the world” (Gadamer 2007, 65). Indeed, as he famously put it in Truth and Method, “Being
that can be understood is language” (Gadamer 2004, 490).
In traditional hermeneutics, we interpret texts through a recursive encounter between the
parts and the whole called the “hermeneutic circle.” As Schleiermacher described it, “there is ...
an opposition between the unity of the whole and the individual parts of the work, so that the
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task could be set in a twofold manner, namely to understand the unity of the whole by the
individual parts and the value of the individual parts via the unity of the whole” (quoted in Lawn
2006, 46). Martin Heidegger expanded this part/whole relationship to the entire process of
understanding, and it is this conception that Gadamer builds upon. As Gadamer describes
Heidegger’s expansion of the hermeneutic circle, it is “is neither subjective nor objective, but
describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the
interpreter.” We anticipate the meaning of a text, and
the anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of
subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this
commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not
simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it
ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a “methodological” circle [as it might
be in traditional hermeneutics], but describes an element of the ontological structure of
understanding (Gadamer 2004, 305).
Not only do we use the parts of a text to understand the whole, and vice versa, we use part of our
own previous beliefs to understand a text while also letting that text affect our beliefs. We do not
approach texts without already having formed some judgment about them, but our judgment
should change as allow our views to change in response to what we read. This ideally leads to
what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons.” In phenomenological jargon, everything that might
be interpreted has a “horizon” of meaning, a permeable boundary, and within hermeneutics
“interpretation is sited within the mutual horizon of the interpreter and the thing to be
interpreted” (Lawn 2006, 2). The past and the present, one culture and another, a reader and a
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text, all have horizons of meaning that interpretation tries to fuse, and even though such fusion is
never complete, for Gadamer “understanding is always the fusion of these horizons” (Gadamer
2004, 317). Similarly, in ordinary English we speak of “expanding our horizons” as a metaphor
for broadening our knowledge and understanding of the world outside of our previous narrow
experience.
The metaphor of “scholarship as a conversation” plays nicely with the idea that
understanding is linguistically mediated, and that our knowledge involves justifying beliefs to
other people through dialogue. Scholarly research within libraries is a fine example of our
“communicative cultural education.” Library research involves searching for texts and using a
variety of them to change and improve our understanding of the world. While neither Rorty’s
conception of knowledge nor Gadamer’s conception of understanding satisfy all comers (and
Rorty in particular has many vigorous if sometimes intellectually unfair critics), arguably
“scholarship as conversation” implies such conceptions.
According to Gadamer, to begin understanding anything from a historical document to a
living person’s arguments we always bring our prejudices (etymologically, our pre-judgments or
our “fore-understandings”) with us, but understanding requires opening ourselves up to the views
of others in the conversation, for “philosophical hermeneutics concludes that understanding is in
fact only possible when one brings one’s own presuppositions into play” (Gadamer 2007, 62),
and “hermeneutical reflection includes the point that in all understanding of a matter, or of
another person, the critique of oneself should also be happening,” because “one who understands
does not claim to hold a superior position in advance, but instead admits that his or her own
assumed truth must be put to the test in the act of understanding” (69-70). And understanding is
rarely reached completely alone. For Gadamer,
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The basic model of reaching an understanding together is dialogue or conversation. As
we know only too well, a conversation is not possible if one of the partners believes
himself or herself to be in a clearly superior position in comparison with the other person,
and assumes that he or she possesses a prior knowledge of the erroneous prejudgments in
which the other is entangled. If one does this, one actually locks oneself into the circle of
one’s own prejudices. Reaching an understanding dialogically is impossible if in
principle one of the partners in a dialogue does not allow himself or herself to enter into a
real conversation (Gadamer 2007, 70).
Indeed, as Nicholas Davey interprets Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, “understanding
requires difference” and an openness to that difference. The hermeneutic encounter is a dialogue,
and “dialogue demands the recognition that, in relation to the other, our assumptions are indeed
questionable,” and that we “risk becoming open to each other” and difficult to ourselves (Davey
2011, 169).
Davey teases out the implication that understanding through the hermeneutic encounter
of the dialogue requires open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courtesy. He
argues that “the aim of hermeneutical engagement is not…to achieve a mastery of adversarial
argument but to use shared intellectual converse and intuition as a means to transcending and
transforming one’s initial presuppositions and outlooks,” and thus “courtesy toward the other is
not just an act of good will but a recognition of indebtedness.” Without using the language of
virtue epistemology, he still brings out the relevance of intellectual virtues, arguing that the
“ethical orientation of hermeneutic practice entails a quiet modesty” (which could entail both
epistemic modesty and intellectual humility) and “marks the acquisition of that knowledge which
knows that whatever perspective we adopt with regard to a subject matter, it is as a limited
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perspective and that we will be reliant on the other for placing it in a new light” (Davey 2011,
68–69), a new light that in Rorty’s words might improve “belief, since new evidence, or new
hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may come along” (Rorty 1999a, 23), an improvement
we might miss if we are epistemically arrogant and intellectually discourteous.
Intellectual courtesy implies that we both listen to and engage with others in our
conversations, because if we do not listen we are trapped in our own limited views, unable to
expand our horizons beyond our conditioned prejudices. If nothing else, a commitment to
intellectual freedom implies that we use that freedom wisely to listen to and attempt to
understand beliefs we do not already hold, a view defended by John Stuart Mill, who argued that
those who know only their “own side of the case, [know] little of that,” and “must be able to hear
[reasons for the opposition] from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in
earnest, and…know them in their most plausible and persuasive form” (Mill 2003, 105). Being
open-minded and humble about our own knowledge requires us to cultivate the virtue of
listening courteously—if perhaps skeptically—to others. For Gadamer, the hermeneutic
encounter through dialogue is also an ethical encounter. According to Chris Lawn, Gadamer
argues that “dialogue is the structure of hermeneutical understanding” and “provides the basis for
a practical ethics” because it “demands patient listening to the voice of the other, discretion,
courtesy, and… a recognition that no one voice has sole authority or a monopoly on truth.”
Opening ourselves to the other in a hermeneutic encounter makes explicit “classic moral virtues”
of “patience, discretion, discernment and empathy” (Lawn 2006, 133).
If Gadamer is correct, we can only understand the world through language and “real
conversation,” and we can engage in genuine conversations only if we practice the intellectual
virtues of open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courtesy. “The true reality of
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human communication is such that a conversation does not simply carry one person’s opinion
through against another’s in argument, or even simply add one opinion to another. Genuine
conversation transforms the viewpoint of both” (Gadamer 2007, 96). If we cannot open our
minds to the possibility of change, if we cannot consider the fact that we may not know what we
think we know, we cannot achieve any understanding of the world at all. We cannot engage in
any dialogues aimed toward knowledge or understanding, but only one-sided monologues that
limit us to our “private and arbitrary subjective biases and prejudices.”
In addition to open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courtesy, we must
consider the virtue of intellectual thoroughness, also implied in the concept of a scholarly
conversation. Entering into a scholarly conversation requires more than listening just to the
voices that we already agree with. Opening our minds to the possibility of change requires us to
consider courteously the voices of others with whom we might disagree. Information literate
people must not only find scholarly conversations relevant to their research questions, but enter
into them intelligently, and to do that means encountering the full range of voices already present
in the conversation. This requires certain bibliographic skills that librarians often teach such as
searching for and evaluating information, but it also involves a disposition to be thorough.
Taking, for example, the first five results from a database search and trying to write a research
essay in response to that “conversation” is perhaps a less aggravating intellectual vice than
ignarrogance, but a vice it nonetheless is. It shows a lack of intellectual thoroughness as well as
open-mindedness and intellectual humility. Cultivating intellectual thoroughness, becoming the
sort of person who is dissatisfied with knowing well only one position on a topic, makes it more
likely to engage in productive scholarly conversations.
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Conclusion
Information literacy benefits from the metaphor of “scholarship as conversation,” and
elaborating the metaphor benefits from a virtue information literacy perspective. A scholarly
conversation is a dialogue among two or more persons with the aim of understanding; it is a
“hermeneutic encounter” in which we engage with others, usually through texts, in a process of
inquiry to increase our own understanding with their aid. To engage in a genuine conversation—
a dialogue and not a monologue—and invite the possibility of understanding that which we do
not already know, and to contribute usefully to that conversation, we must open our minds to the
possibility that the other has useful knowledge, courteously engage the other in conversation, and
have the intellectual humility or modesty to accept that our beliefs—indeed our entire conception
of ourselves—are never final, but always open to revision in the light of knew knowledge and
understanding. Cultivating a range of intellectual virtues helps in this endeavor, particularly
those of open-mindedness, intellectual humility, intellectual courtesy, and intellectual
thoroughness. Furthermore, librarians should do more than encourage students to cultivate such
intellectual virtues; we should cultivate them ourselves.
VIL and the notion of intellectual or information virtues can be fruitfully applied to a
range of information literacy behaviors and topics. Anytime we think of information literacy as a
set of dispositions or character traits, anytime we seek to cultivate those traits in ourselves or our
students, anytime we consider information-seeking behavior as an ethical encounter with others,
and anytime we do so with the goal of giving ourselves and others the information literacy tools
to live happier and more flourishing lives, we are at least implicitly applying a VIL perspective.
In future, I hope to address the extraordinary measures we might have to take these days to
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become information literate, as well as the possibility that libraries can be virtuous information
environments.
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